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Abstract—The security challenges arising at the layer between
their digital and physical components of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) are, at the same time, pressing, important and complex. In
this paper, we discuss how the unique nature of CPSs influences
and drives security analysis through two case studies. We also
discuss how sensors and their networks, being a key element of
the aforementioned interaction surface, are critical to this effort.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many real-world systems, computational and physical
resources are strictly interconnected: embedded computers
receive inputs from the external, physical world through an
array of sensors, and in turn govern physical actuators, creating
a smart, flexible control loop, capable of adaptation, autonomy
and improved efficiency. These systems are commonly and
broadly defined cyber-physical systems (CPS) [1].
Common examples include industrial control systems
(now particularly interesting, in light of the “Industry 4.0”
paradigm), computerized controls of vehicles, wireless sensor
networks, and almost all of the devices usually encompassed
by the broad term “Internet of Things”.
We can identify at least three reasons why security, safety
and reliability of CPS are research areas of foremost impor-
tance.
First, such systems are often a key component of modern
critical infrastructure: They are vital to our societys viability,
to its economical and social stability. Typical examples include
the smart grid, control systems used by other utilities, trans-
portation systems, but also industrial control systems more in
general. Many medical devices, in particular implantable ones,
are also becoming CPSs [2], [3], often remotely monitored.
Second, critical CPS have a very challenging and wide
threat landscape, ranging from intentional targeted attacks to
terrorist acts, from unplanned disruptions to market distur-
bances, up to and including state-level threats connected to
international policy shifts or even cyberwarfare [4]. In [5],
half of the interviewed critical infrastructure operators men-
tion what they perceived as politically-motivated cyberattacks,
claiming an average of 10 of those over 5 years, causing an
average cost of $850,000 per company.
Third, many modern CPS are increasingly autonomous,
lacking a human in the control loop. A significant example,
which is the subject of a lot of attention at the moment [6],
are self-driving cars: highly complex CPSs, with a large array
of sensors and actuators, a complex world to navigate in, and
external connectivity to the road infrastructure and, often, to
the Internet. But many CPSs are increasingly autonomous, and
this exacerbates the potential security hazards if a malicious
attacker compromises them.
Due to the reasons above, many researchers (both in
academia and throughout the industry) developed potential at-
tacks, analyzed vulnerabilities and pointed out flaws. However,
such academic results have triggered in some cases limited
response throughout the industry. One of the challenges is the
lack of a perceived threat level that can justify the investment
of significant resources [2], [7]. Conversely, some works in
the area may appear over-hyped, or may even unwillingly
overstate the potentially dire consequences of an attack. Since
security investment is a risk-based decision, in order to bake
security in the CPS development phases, as opposed to trying
to deliver it as an afterthought, a risk-based design process
suitable for each environment must be adopted. We summarily
describe one, in an automotive use-case, in Section II.
Another very significant aspect is the unique set of chal-
lenges arising from the combination of a computational nature
(which is, by definition, discrete and adherent to rigid speci-
fications) and of a continuous physical system which is often
not easily modeled and not completely understood. In parallel,
safety-critical physical systems are commonly designed with
safety, not security, in mind, contrarily to the digital systems
they are coupled with. The interconnection between such
systems creates new attack surfaces that are neither purely
physical, nor purely digital. These surfaces cannot be identified
if such systems are studied separately. In other words, besides
finding digital vulnerabilities (e.g., a buffer overflow bug), we
must assess and validate to what extent such vulnerabilities
can be exploited in practice to facilitate or enable new physical
attacks (e.g., instability); and vice-versa. An example of such a
technique, applied to the security analysis of industrial robots,
is summarized in Section III.
As we will show throughout the remainder of this paper,
sensors and their networks, being a key element of the
interaction surface between the digital and the physical world,
are also on the front line of these new concepts in security
vulnerabilities and secure design.
Fig. 1. An example of Attack Tree, as shown in [7]
II. RISK-BASED DESIGN OF AUTOMOTIVE NETWORKS
Cybersecurity of vehicular networks is a relatively recent
concern: The very first comprehensive cybersecurity assess-
ment of such networks is less than 10 years old [8], [9].
The first vehicle cybersecurity standard by SAE very correctly
mandates risk-based design of automotive networks [10].
In [7] we proposed and automated a concept of analy-
sis based on attack trees (inspired by [11]). Our proposal
integrates a formal risk analysis methodology based on the
development of very general attack trees that can be easily
maintained and updated along with the evolution of domain
knowledge.
We can see an example of such a tree in Figure 1, we can
model an attacker who has the goal of causing an accident.
The root of the tree is the abstract attacker goal. In this
simplistic example, the only way to reach that goal is to
steer the car regardless of driver input, which in turn can be
obtained through either of two different methods. One of them,
for instance, consists of generating a “Lane Steer Command”,
but it requires an ALA (Active Lane Assist) component to be
present. The lane steering command can be generated in turn
through three different actions.
Attack trees allow the model to be strongly modular, making
it easy to add new methods by just combining steps, or by
adding new ones. If new information arises (or new methods
are identified) the model can be updated easily and updates
can be propagated throughout the tree chain and throughout
the other steps of our methodology.
The leaf nodes of these threes can be mapped on the topol-
ogy of the network under design, as shown in Figure 2. This
is actually the core novelty in our proposed approach, and it
allows to (i) consider only attacks that are actually achievable
given the topology under assessment and (ii) considering the
impact of the topology on the feasibility of those attacks, with
the final aim of proposing structural countermeasures.
By using a modified version of the risk functions proposed
in [11] we can obtain a qualitative but precise assessment of
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Fig. 2. Topology example: three buses (colored in blue) and multiple
components connected to them, among which the ones in Figure 1.
risk for each attack and attack path.
For each network, an automated algorithm can propose a
set of architectural changes to the layout, and the insertion
of control points such as security gateways, to improve the
overall security of the system (we do not currently consider the
insertion of intrusion detection systems, e.g. [12]). The current
version of the algorithm considers several types of design
constraints before proposing mutations, but it can definitely be
refined more in future versions of the work. Also, currently
we do not take into account potential attacks to the availability
of the CAN bus itself, as shown in [13].
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON AN INDUSTRIAL
ROBOT
Our seminal work on the security of industrial robots [14]
was motivated by a few key observations: First, the increased
connectivity of robot systems is (and will be) exposing
robots to cyber attacks. Indeed, nowadays, industrial robots—
originally conceived to be isolated—are exposed to corporate
networks and to the Internet.
Second, whereas robots were traditionally designed to op-
erate in a protected workspace, physically separated from hu-
mans, vendors are introducing several models of collaborative
robots able to work nearby humans. This, along with the
gradual shift of safety devices’ implementations from hard-
wired logic to more flexible software-based implementations,
increases the potential safety impact of cybersecurity issues.
Third, a survey of robotics users and integrators revealed
scarce awareness of security risks.
Motivated by these observations, we defined an attacker
model, introduced industrial-robot-specific attacks based on
the properties that a robot must possess, and experimentally
verified their feasibility on a standard robot architecture.
In order to understand what is a robot-specific attack, we
must first observe that robots are expected to follow three
“laws” or requirements. First, accuracy: they should read pre-
cise values from sensors, and issue correct and accurate com-
mands to the actuators, so that the movements are performed
TABLE I
ATTACK SUMMARY WITH VIOLATED REQUIREMENTS
Attack Safety Integrity Accuracy
Control Loop Alteration 3 3 3
User-perceived Robot State Alteration 3 7 7
Robot State Alteration 3 3 3
Production Logic Tampering 3 3 3
Calibration Parameters Tampering 3 3 3
within acceptable error margins. The second requirement is
safety: Robots must expose sufficient and correct information
so that operators can take safe and informed decisions; allow
operators to engage emergency procedures; execute emergency
procedures quickly and safely. Finally, robots should ensure
their integrity, minimizing the risk that badly written control
logic may result in damage to their physical parts.
We consider a robot-specific cyberattack any violation of
these requirements that can be initiated through a digital
vector.
We model attackers according to their goals, their level of
access to the system, and their capabilities. For the complete
taxonomy, we refer the interested reader to [14]. It is however
relevant for the scope of the present paper to briefly summarize
our results related to attacker goals. While the goal of an
attacker who targets a digital system is usually either to gain
unauthorized access to data and software capabilities, or to
disable the system itself (Denial-of-Service), in a robot other
goals are also possible: the attacker can aim to alter the
production outcome, injecting faults and micro-defects (which
can cause financial losses or even safety concerns); they can
also aim to physically damage machinery or personnel. This
extended threat model naturally led us to develop several new
types of robot-specific cyberattacks. Table I summarizes the
attacks and the corresponding requirements they violate.
The first type of attack leverages the fact that in robots
kinematics and configuration parameters are stored in con-
figuration files that attackers can modify (and users, often,
cannot even edit or see). The most interesting parameters to
modify are the ones affecting the robot movements, which can
lead to several consequences. By detuning closed- or open-
loop control parameters, the robot’s trajectories can be made
unstable or modified (violating the accuracy requirement, but
depending on the type of modification safety and integrity can
also be affected: for instance by making the robot apply forces
beyond specifications).
A second type of attack deals with the information provided
to the user by the robot’s UI. This information can be
relevant for user safety, and is remarkably easy to alter for
an attacker. In a variant of this attack, motor state, and even
emergency stop signals (in some architectures) are also prone
to modification by an attacker.
Of course, attackers can also tamper with the production
logic (i.e., with the programming of the robot itself), obtaining
results that range from obvious disruption to the insidious
insertion of micro-defects that are difficult or impossible to
spot.
Finally, attackers can modify calibration data. After any
configuration change, the sensing equipment of robots must
be calibrated to compensate for known measurement errors
when triggering servo motors. This data, initially stored in
the sensing equipment, is transmitted to the controller during
system boot. Then, the controller uses its local copy of the
data, which is vulnerable to manipulation by an attacker. Such
manipulation can force a servo motor to move erratically or
unexpectedly, because the true error in the measured signal
(e.g., joint position) is different from the error that the con-
troller knows. This can lead to abnormal movements, and also
to excessive speed or force being applied.
It is important to note how all of these attacks are made
possible by the unique digital/physical surface of CPSs, and
happen precisely at that layer. The role of sensing equipment
(in particular for the last attack we mentioned) is very evident.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we briefly discussed the security challenges
arising at the layer between the digital and the physical
components of CPSs. We showed how critical the problem
is, because of the vital role such systems play, because of the
existence of threat actors, and because of the increasing degree
of autonomy of CPSs.
We analyzed two examples of how the unique nature of
CPSs influences and drives security analysis. In particular,
we showed how the physical topology of a CPS network
can influence risk assessment and proposed risk-based design
approaches for a specific type of systems (in the automotive
field). We also showed how the physical impact of attacks can
drive the identification of new threats and threat vectors (with
an example drawn from robotics).
Sensors and their networks, being a key element of the
interaction surface between the digital and the physical world,
are heavily impacted by these new types of attacks and their
corresponding novel defense strategies.
As CPSs evolve in complex interconnections of autonomous
systems, interacting both digitally and physically, sensing
the world and reacting smartly to the external conditions,
becoming a cloud-like, transparent infrastructure around our
lives and our society, it becomes imperative to ensure that
their emerging safety and security properties are accurately
assessed. More research is needed to make this a systematic
engineering approach.
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